Rennold Pender v. Mose Alix et al : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Rennold Pender v. Mose Alix et al : Reply Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
R. S. Johnson; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pender v. Alix, No. 9167 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3544
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF~ LED 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, f\PR 8- 1960 
vs. 
MOSE ALIX, et al., Case 
Defendants and Respondents, 9,167 
vs. 
LEON BROWN, 
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF Of APPELLANT 
R. S. JOHNSON, 
Attorney-for-Plaintiff 
and Appellant, Rennold Pender 
207 Atlas Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CO·NTENTS_______________________________________________ i 
INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED ____ ii 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
POINT I-REFUTATION Of RESPONDENT'S 
POINT I (REGARDING RESPO'NDENT'S 
CLAIM OF TAX TITLE AS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT)__ 2 
POINT II-REFUT A TIO,N O·F RESPONDENT'S 
POINT II (RELATING TO RESPO,NDENT'S 
CLAIM THAT APPELLANT MADE NO 
SHOWING OF TITLE)------------------------------------ 5 
POINT III-REFUTATION Of RESPON-
DENT'S POINT III (ANENT THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATION) ---------------------------------------------- 7 
CON CL USI 0 N ----------------------------------------------------------- 1 o 
PROOF OF SERVICE____________________________________________________ 12 
-1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Page 
Bank of California National Association vs. Superior 
Court 106 Pac. 2nd 879, 16 Cal. 516 _____________________ 10 
Campbell vs. Union Savings & Investment Company, 
226 Pac. 190, 63 Utah 3 66 ___________________________________ 6, 7 
Carlisle vs. Monongahela Railway Company, 16 F. R. D. 
4 2 6 ------------------------~-------------------------------------------8' •9 
Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company vs. Olson 
258 Pac. 216, 70 Utah 95 ___________________________________ ], 8 
Kam Koon Won vs. E. E. Black, Ltd., 75 Fed. Sup. 553 9 
Marek vs. Smith, 314 Pac. 2nd 864_________________________ 8 
Pender vs. Bird, 224 Pac. 2nd 1057, 119 Utah 9L_____ 6 
Peterson vs. Johnson, 34 Pac. 2nd 697, 84 Utah 89 ___ _4, 5 
Price vs. Hanson, 206 Pac. 272, 60 Utah 29_______________ 3 
Reader vs. District Court of the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict, 94 Pac. 2nd 8 55, 9 8 Utah 1_______________________ 10 
Toronto vs. Sheffield, 222 Pac. 2nd 594, 118 Utah 460 3 
Turner vs. White, 12 So. 601, 97 Alabama 545_ __________ 10 
Upper Marion Ditch Company, 76 Pac. 2nd 234, 94 
Utah 13 4 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Wood vs. Dill, 43 Pac. 822, 3 Kan. App. 484_______________ 8 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MOSE ALIX, et al., Case 
Defendants and Respondents, 9,167 
vs. 
LEON BROWN, 
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Appellant's 
Reply Brief. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent in this cause made, and makes no effort 
in his brief to answer the appellant's points squarely and 
under the same headings as set out, but, instead, in an 
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attempt to dispose of them by making his own arguments 
under unrelated points that fail to meet the issues raised, 
and by beclouding those issues with ttplatitudinous" half-
truths and semi-quotations from cases, insinuates facts and 
law, that, thus contrived, appear plausible, and which 
closer analysis will show are not sustainable. 
POINT I. 
REFUTATION of RESPONDENT'S POINT I-
( REGARDING RESPO,NDENT'S CLAIM OF TAX 
TITLE AS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT LOWER 
COURT'S JUDGMENT) 
Respondent would have it appear that acquisition of 
a county tax deed and payment of taxes over a period, 
would, without question, clothe him with a title so valid 
and formidable as to exclude all thought of any question 
thereto or thereof. 
Much is made of the fact that appellant ttoffered no 
testimony or other evidence at any time" (Respondent's 
Brief, Page 9). Yet, at the same time, it will appear that 
respondent did not introduce in evidence, or have marked 
any exhibits, offer any abstract of title in evidence, or in 
anywise, except for the self-serving affidavit of inter-
vening plaintiff, Brown, the respondent herein, relating 
to his purported use of the property; and, consequently 
respondent's evidentiary pretentions rise to no higher dig-
nity than any exhibits or affidavits filed and offered by 
appellant. All were before the trial court, and considered 
during the hearing. 
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Respondent's counsel further overlooks the point 
that, as well stated in Price vs. Hanson, 206 Pacific 272, 
60 Utah, 29, by this Honorable Court, that: 
((We remark, however, that a party seeking 
to intervene in a particular action should make it 
appear that he would have been at least a proper 
party to the action when it was commenced, and, 
in which he seeks to intervene, and that he would 
have been entitled to the relief he seeks in a separate 
action in the same court against the parties against 
whom he seeks relief." 
Certainly, at the time of the commencement of this 
action in 1947, the respondent might have qualified as a 
proper party, but ((would he have been" THEN, entitled 
to the relief which he seeks here. The obvious answer is an 
((ABSOLUTE NEGATIVE", since in 1947, when ap-
pellant's action was instituted, respondent, whatever the 
worth of his purported tax deed, could not have then 
had a title by adverse possession based on seven years 
occupation, usage, payment of taxes, particularly since, 
in view of the subsequent holding of Toronto vs. Sheffield, 
222 Pac. 2nd 594, 118 Utah 460, the legislatures then 
abortive attempt at a short statute of limitations had 
been declared unconstitutional, and particularly, inas-
much as respondent claimed no interest prior to Septem-
ber 16th, 1942. 
Further, (Respondent's Brief, page 11), there is an 
attempt to alleviate the effect of the cited portion of L. 
H. Gray's affidavit (Appellant's Brief, page 3) relative 
to the claimed invalidity of Salt Lake County's then 
impending tax sale. No matter how much or how many 
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other reasons, especially those that might seem pertinent 
to a layman, may be set forth in the protest as to the tax 
sale, obviously those inapplicable may be regarded merely 
as surplusage, and, do not contradict or detract from the 
statement contained therein that the real property here-
in involved, nis not assessed according to law". 
Respondent (Respondent's Brief, page 15) arrogates 
to himself as beneficial the statements in the Porschatis 
and Ford affidavits (Rec. 32-34; Appellant's Brief, pages 
9-10) filed by appellant, whereas in truth and effect they 
illustrate, at most, intermittent and less than the full, com-
plete, adverse, occupation and usage of the property, with 
notice to all the world thereof, that is required under the 
circumstances. 
There are extensive quotes (Respondent's Brief, pages 
13-15) from the case of Peterson vs. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 
34 Pac. 2nd 697, to prove that there is a parallel situation 
in that and the instant case. No such conclusion may be 
drawn, nor is it justifiable, for in the Peterson case, it was 
apparent that the plaintiff's tax title was sufficient as 
against defendant's claim of boundary establishment by 
fence, in absence of (a) Any showing that defendant's 
deed to his own land included the tract in dispute, (b) 
That there was any boundary line agreement made pursu-
ant to a dispute in connection with the establishment of 
the fence, (c) That there had been any long period of 
acquiesence in the line established by the fence. 
Whereas, in this case, as shown by the deed to ap-
pellant herein (Rec. 3 5), his claim was not as to land to 
which he had no claim or color of title; and the realty 
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here in question was described and included within his 
deed description. The situation in the Peterson case is no-
wise comparable with the instant case on the facts or the 
law, and the omission from the respondent's quoted ex-
cerpt of the fact (page 698, 34 Pac. 2nd), ((It is further 
made to appear that the strip of land in dispute is within 
the description contained in the plaintiff's deed, and the 
defendant has all of the land covered by the description in 
his deed, INDEPENDENT OF THE STRIP OF LAND 
IN CONTROVERSY" destroys the contextual meaning 
of the original quote. 
POINT II. 
REFUTATION O,F RESPO'NDENT'S POINT II: 
(Relating to respondent's claim that appellant made no 
showing of title.) 
Respondent's arguments under this heading are so 
self-contradictory and illogical as to destroy any effective-
ness therein. 
For example, respondent (Respondent's Brief, page 
17, asserts appellant did NO'T plead title to the land in 
himself, and yet at that same point (Respondent's Brief, 
page 17) quotes from the lis pendens, and cites that ap-
pellant had filed his complaint praying for rr quieting of 
title in appellant." Certainly, any complaint to quiet title 
in due form would contain the essential allegations of 
ownership, possession, or entitlement thereto. 
Again, respondent assails appellant's ((Quit-Claim 
Deed" as though some sort of stigma was attached to the 
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taking of a quitclaim deed, and although grudgingly con-
ceding a quitclaim is effective to convey the interest of 
the grantor, attempts to cast aspersions on the taking of 
that type of deed. Certainly, a warranty deed (in the 
absence of after acquired title, which is not involved here) 
could convey no greater title than could a quitclaim 
deed used. 
Respondent's futile attempts at parallelism are fur-
ther illustrated by his attempt to misconstrue the mean-
ing of the language and wording quoted from Pender vs. 
Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 Pac 2nd 1057, into some kind of 
meaning, albeit grossly distorted, presumably favoring his 
cause. The language in that case is inapplicable to the 
case at bar, because there has been no showing, and no such 
item was here involved, as a deed absolute given as a 
mortgage, which, when the debt was paid and the obliga-
tion cancelled, operated to extinguish the force and ef-
fect of the deed, so that a conveyance by the deed holder 
would be ineffectual to carry any title to the grantee. 
Here, the deed of Arnold Wall (Rec. 3 5) is as much 
prima facie valid to convey title as was respondent's tax 
deed. 
The quotation by respondent from Campbell vs. 
Union Savings & Investment Company, 63 Utah 366, 226 
Pac. 190, fails to include the pertinent information stated 
by the Court, that such rule as cited, was based on the fact 
that (page 192), t(No claim is made in the answer and 
counterclaim (to the there plaintiff's quiet title action) 
that Langlois, who executed and delivered the mortgage 
(assigned to defendant) had or claimed any right or title 
in the property in question, nor that the plaintiff claimed 
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under or through said Langlois. Indeed, in defendant's 
answer and counterclaim, Langlois is not connected with 
the title to the property in question." Lifted out of con-
text, and without reference to the facts, the respondent's 
quote appears definitely not in point, nor suggestive of a 
rule of property law consonant with any facts in this case. 
POINT III. 
REFUTATION OF RESPONDENT'S POINT III 
-(Anent the Statute of Limitations). 
Assumption that the pretended occupation of the 
premises by respondent herein [which as shown by affi-
davits filed on behalf of appellant herein (Rec. 32-34) to 
have been at most intermittent and disjoined, and non-
exclusive] was so exclusive as to deprive appellant of the 
benefit of having any possession or occupation, should 
be viewed in the light of the language of the Court in 
Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company vs. Olson, 70 
Utah 95, 258 Pac. 216, in the following excerpt: 
Page 222 Pacific cc [ 6] The presumption is against the 
question of title by adverse possession.", and again at 
Page 227 Pacific: ccln adverse possession the 
possession must be actual, for otherwise there is no 
disseisen, and the real owner remains in possession 
actually and constructively. It must be continu-
ous, for, upon suspension or interruption, possession 
in contemplation of law is again in the holder of 
the legal title; and it must be hostile to the real 
owner, and with the intention to claim the land 
adversely to him. This claim must be manifest 
from the nature of the circumstances of the pos-
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session, so that the owner may be informed of it, 
and that he shall not be misled into quiescence in 
what he might reasonably suppose to be a mere 
trespass when he would not aquiesce in the as-
sertion of a right adverse to his own title." 
Respondent's excerpt from Wood vs. Dill, 3 Kan 
App 484, 43 Pac 822, is not applicable to the circum-
stances here, as the court there very properly held that a 
mechanic's lien foreclosure that omitted as a party, a 
mortgagee appearing of record, did not toll the statute 
of limitations respecting the time to foreclose the lien 
against the mortgage holder, since ((Their owner's and 
mortgagee's interests were neither common nor identical." 
Certainly, here, the purported interests of Salt Lake 
County passed on to the respondent Brown in the tax deed, 
were common and identical, encompassing the same, if 
any, rights to the land in question. 
The quoted portion from the Marek vs. Smith case, 
314 Pac 2nd 864, relating to applicability of the statute 
of limitations to a new party, is an inapplicable rule as to 
this situation both factually and otherwise. The case 
shows that the county pleading the statute, had disclaimed 
any interest in the premises, and claimed that its interest 
having been conveyed long since, it was not and could not 
become a party to the action against the bar of the statute 
of limitations. Further, there was no showing in such 
cause that the county pleading the statute of limitations 
was either an absolutely ((necessary" party, or an ((indis-
pensable" party. 
In the .carlisle vs. Monongahela Railway Co. case, 16 
F. R.D. 426, the portion cited is based on the federal pro-
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cedure that a plaintiff that cannot join for jurisdictional 
reasons certain other parties, cannot in effect circumvent 
the rule by having an interpleader of a second party, who, 
may in turn seek to join another party, identically the 
same as which plaintiff could not join in the first instance. 
The dicta quoted from the Kam Koon Won vs. E. E. 
Black, Ltd. case, 75 Fed Sup. 55 3, is shown up by the 
actual holding in the case, to the effect that t(U nder these 
circumstances the claims of intervening plaintiffs related 
back (page 5 64) to the date when the action was filed 
by the original plaintiff for himself and in their behalf." 
All of these situations, quoted piecemeal, seem to sus-
tain plaintiff in intervention and respondent's position 
until analyzed and the factual situation shown up so as 
to differentiate them from the situation in the instant case. 
Indeed, the situation here is akin to that commented 
on by our Court in the Case of Upper Marion Ditch Com-
pany, 94 Utah, 134, 76 Pac 2nd 234, where the court said 
at: 
Page 240 Pac. 2nd t( [ 16-18] : Whenever a party 
has been omitted, whose presence is so indispens-
able to a decision of the case upon its merits that 
a final decree cannot be made materially affecting 
his interests, the Court should not proceed to a de-
cision of the case upon the merits. The objection 
may be made by any party at a hearing or on ap-
peal or error, and the court will upon its own mo-
tion take notice of the omission and require the 
omitted party to be made a party-to the litigation, 
even though no objection is made by any party 
litigant." 
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And, as stated by the Court in Reader vs. District 
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 94 Pac 2nd 8 55, 
98 Utah 1, at page 861 Pac. 2nd: 
tt/9 /The failure of the court to obtain juris-
diction over one of the indispensable parties ren-
dered the judgment as to all of them void." 
So here, to permit the case to proceed, the respondent 
would have had to have been joined in the original Mose 
Alix suit, to continue proceedings, or in absence thereof, 
judgment could not be rendered, and to permit the joinder, 
either as a defendant, or in that effect by intervening, there 
is a necessity for tolling the statute of limitations until the 
necessary party is joined. 
In this connection, see Bank of California National 
Association vs. Superior Court, 106 Pac. 2nd 879, 16 Cal 
516, at page 8 8 3, as to a further discussion of what may 
constitute indispensable parties, and how to classify par-
ties to an action. 
CONCLUSION 
The situation in this case is akin to that set out by 
the Court in Turner vs. White, 12 So. 601, 97 Alabama 
545, where the Court said at page 603: 
((3. It is a principle often repeated, that, if, dur-
ing the pendency of a suit, any new matter or 
claim not before asserted is set up and related back 
by complaint, the defendant has the right to insist 
upon the benefit of the statute until the time that 
the new claim is presented, because until that trial, 
there was no lis pendens as to that matter between 
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the parties .... But this was no amendment by the 
plaintiff and Mrs. Turner came into the· suit on 
her own petition, filed in accordance with the 
statute, to make herself a defendant as landlord, 
and against the objection of the plaintiff, she was 
admitted to defend her title against the claim of 
title by the plaintiffs, and the very purpose of her 
application and of her being admitted was to test 
the strength and validity of competing titles. Her 
claim was within the lis pendens. If the statute 
of limitations gave her a title against plaintiffs' 
assertion on which she was willing to rely, why 
should she come into this suit? When admitted in 
the manner in which she was, her position in the 
case was the same as if notice had been served on 
her to make her a party, at the same time it was 
served on the other defendants." 
It follows that the application of intervenor herein 
to enter this case, places him in the same position, as an 
indispensable party joined as a party de.fendant, and the 
statute of limitations is tolled as to him, and the pen-
dency of the action brought by plaintiff, tolls the 
statute of limitations until such time as the indispensable 
party (respondent here) is so joined, either vol un taril y, 
or involuntarily. It having been so demonstrated that 
respondent has interposed no real, substantial, or legal 
aspects contrary to the position advocated by appellant 
in his original brief, then it is the prayer of the appellant, 
that this Honorable Court, find that the statute of limi-
tations tolled as to the respondent, that there are justici-
able issues of fact involved in this cause, and, questions 
as to the sufficiency of the adverse possession purportedly 
relied upon by defendant, and reverse the action of the 
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district court in entering a summary judgment and judg-
ment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent in this 
cause, and remand the same for further proceedings to 
the district court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. S. JOHNSON, 
Attor:ney for Plaintiff and 
Ap~pellant 
Receipt of three copies and due service hereof, acknowl-
edged this ________________ day of April, 1960. 
Attorneys-/or-Intervening Plaintiff and 
Respondent, Leon Brown. 
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